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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Pre-Trial Discovery-Failure to Reveal Information-Remedies.
In two cases coming before the Washington court in the past year,
problems have arisen as to the appropriate sanctions to be invoked
against a litigant who conceals information sought to be obtained on
discovery or who refuses to answer questions propounded on discovery.
In Sather v. Lindakl, the plaintiff denied knowing of any witnesses to
the accident in question in response to a question put to him on dis-
covery. At the trial, the plaintiff produced four eyewitnesses. On cross
examination it appeared that they had been known to the plaintiff at
the time his deposition was taken. The only relief sought by the de-
fendant was by way of a motion for a mistrial made after the plaintiff's
closing argument to the jury. The court held that relief should have
been sought by a timely objection to the witnesses being allowed to
testify, or a motion to strike should the witnesses have been permitted
to testify. In the absence of such timely action, relief is not available
either by way of a motion for a mistrial or a motion for a new trial.
The instant case is not a holding that the remedy of mistrial is not
appropriate. Rather, it is an application of the principle that objections
not timely made are deemed waived.' The court catalogues the -avail-
able remedies in this manner: "The trial judge can sustain such an
objection and refuse to permit the witness to testify or can order his
testimony stricken; or he can grant a continuance to give the surprised
party an opportunity to investigate the witness and secure rebuttal
testimony; and it is possible that, under circumstances in which no
other relief or penalty could remedy the situation created by the de-
ception, he could grant a mistrial."
In Kagele v. Fredrick,' the court is confronted with the problem of
the litigant who fails to respond to interrogatories within the period
of time for filing answers. The defendant submitted written interroga-
tories to the plaintiff. No answers were served until the day before the
trial, some forty-one days after the interrogatories were first submitted.
The defendant moved to strike the complaint and to dismiss the action.
The trial court refused. On appeal, the trial court's action was held
not to be an abuse of discretion upon two grounds: (1) this was not
a failure to answer interrogatories for which a penalty is provided but
1143 Wash. Dec. 428, 261 P.2d 682 (1953).
2 State v. Shock, 41 Wn.2d 572, 250 P.2d 516 (1952).
3 143 Wash. Dec. 378, 261 P.2d. 699 (1953).
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a delay in answering for which no penalty is provided, and (2) the
striking of a complaint for failure to answer interrogatories is such a
harsh remedy that it will not be granted except upon a clear showing
of prejudice.
The parties and the court alike consider only the procedure for the
submission of interrogatories set out in RCW 5.04. RCW 2.04.190
authorizes the court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure. This the court has done by adopting those rules now con-
tained in 34A Wn.2d, including an excellent set of rules governing
discovery proceedings.4 In addition to giving to the court this rule
making power, the legislature has declared that when rules of court
shall have been promulgated in accordance with that statute, all laws
in conflict therewith shall become of no further force and effect.5 The
procedure prescribed in RCW 5.04.020 and RCW 5.04.030 varies
materially from that prescribed in Rules of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure 33.6
It would be unfortunate were the approach here used by the court
applied to cases arising under the discovery sections of the Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure. The adoption by the court of the
rules contained in 34 A Wn.2d has been described as "a landmark in
the history of procedural reform in the state of Washington." 7 One
of the fundamental objectives of those rules, particularly the rules
dealing with discovery, was the elimination of the sporting theory of
litigation which embodies the idea of concealing as much as possible
from your adversary in the hope that he can be surprised out of court.
This object can be accomplished only by judicial interpretation of the
rules which is designed to preserve their integrity and effectiveness.
It remains to be seen how well the grounds of decision employed in
the instant case meet the standard here suggested.
The court asserts that the plaintiff here did not fail to answer the
interrogatories submitted but merely delayed his answer. Judicial
countenance of the practice of delaying answer to interrogatories until
the last possible minute before the trial is hardly consistent with the
suggested objective of the discovery rules, the elimination of surprise
as a major factor in the trial of a lawsuit. In addition, if, as the court
suggests, a failure to serve answers to interrogatories within the time
4 Rt'LES OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 26 through 37, 34A Wn.2d 84 et seq.
5 RCW 2.04.200. See Nicktovich v. Olympic Motor Transit Co., 148 Wash. 410, 269
Pac. 337 (1928).
6 34A Wn.2d 97.
7 Green, Procedural Progress in Washington, 26 WASH. L. REv. 87 (1951).
[MAY
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
limited by the rule (or statute) is not to be considered a failure to
answer, then the court has deprived the express time limit contained
in the rule of all effect. The federal courts, in applying their discovery
rule8 which is verbatim with the Washington rule, have not had
occasion to deal squarely with this question, but a federal court has
indicated that when no answer has been submitted within the time
limited by the rule, there has been a failure to answer.'
The court also relies upon the lack of a clear showing of prejudice
to the interrogating party resulting from the adverse party's failure
to comply with the discovery procedure. In those cases in which the
court had occasion to apply the sanctions for failure to make discovery
authorized by RCW 5.04.060, a showing of prejudice was required as
a condition precedent to the availability of the remedies therein pro-
vided.10 No Washington cases have been found in which the sanctions
made available by Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 3711 have
been granted or denied on the merits. The federal courts, in applying
the federal equivalent of this rule,1" seem to look not to the injury to
the complaining party caused by the failure to make discovery, but
instead look to the motive or purpose of the adverse party in refusing
to make discovery 1 3 Such an approach, it is submitted, is better
calculated to preserve the vitality of the discovery process.
WILLIAM S. STINNETTE
Denial of New Trial-Duty of Trial Court to Give Reasons. State
v. Arnold1 added another step to Rule 16, Rules of the Superior
Court.1 5 The pertinent portion of the rule provides:
In all cases wherein the trial court grants or denies a motion for a new trial,
it shall, in the order granting or denying the motion, give definite reasons of
law and facts for so doing.
In the Arnold case, the trial court denied a motion for a new trial
but did not enter a written order stating the reasons for denying the
motion. The defendant did not complain of this violation of Rule 16
until his appeal. The court held that in order to take advantage of the
8 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 33, 28 U.S.C.A. 245.
0 Dann v. Compagnie Generale Trans-Atlantique, 29 F. Supp. 330 (DCNY 1939).10 Gostina v. Whithan, 148 Wash. 72, 268 Pac. 132 (1928).
11 34A Wn2d 101.
12 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUR 37, 28 U.S.C.A. 342.
Is Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino, 173 F.2d 466 (C.A.Mich. 1949);
Dunn v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 96 F. Supp. 597 (D.C.Ohio 1951).
14 143 Wash. Dec. 57, 259 P.2d 1104 (1953).
15 34A Wn.2d 118 (1951)..
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above quoted section of Rule 16, the trial court's attention must be
called to the rule and compliance therewith requested.
Two previous cases touched on the rule." In the case of In Re Dands
Estate,' the court denied a motion for a new trial. The counsel for the
appellant approved as to form the order denying the new trial. The
court held that counsel could not for the first time on appeal ques-
tion the form of the order. In the case of Mulka v. Keyes," the trial
court granted a new trial and in compliance with Rule 16, assigned the
reasons therefor. The court reversed this decision and granted judg-
ment for the plaintiff according to the verdict. The court held that the
reasons for granting a new trial were not sufficient. In the Mulka case,
the court made no mention of having to call the trial court's attention
to Rule 16.
There is an apparent tendency on the court's part to distinguish
(1) orders granting a motion for a new trial and (2) orders denying
a motion for a new trial. In cases involving an order granting a new
trial, the Mulka case holds that Rule 16 operates to require that the
reasons in support of it be sufficient and does not suggest that the trial
court's attention must be directed to the rule to take advantage of it
on appeal. Whereas in cases involving the denying of a motion for a
new trial, it is necessary to call the trial court's attention to Rule 16
before the rule can be taken advantage of on appeal.' Such an inter-
pretation seems in line with the background of the rule."0
The rule was promulgated as a result of the case of Coppo v. Van
Wieringen."' In the Coppo case, Justice Hill indicated the Supreme
Court would be able to perform the appellate function more effectively
if the trial court was required to state reasons of law and fact for the
granting of the new trial order.2 Only passing mention was made of
orders denying a new trial in Coppo case. As has been pointed out,2"
the Coppo case stressed that the rule should be non-adversary in nature.
That is, the rule is for the court's benefit so it can rule intelligently and
by implication it should not have to be pressed on the trial court.
16 Mulka v. Keyes, 41 Wn.2d 427, 249 P.2d 972 (1952) noted in 28 WASH. L. REv.
241 (1953) ; In Re Dand's Estate, 41 Wn.2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952).
17 41 Wn.2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952).
18 41 Wn.2d 427, 249 P.2d 972 (1952).
10 State v. Arnold, 143 Wash. Dec. 57, 259 P.2d 1104 (1953) ; In Re Dand's Estate,
41 Wn.2d 158, 427 P.2d 1016 (1952).
20 Coppo v. Van Wieringen, 36 Wn.2d 120, 217 P2d 294 (1950) note in 26 WASH. L.
REv. 87, 109 (1951) and 28 WASH. L. REv. 241 (1953).
21 Note 20 supra.
22 See Note, 28 WASH. L. REv. 241 (1953).
2326 WASH. L. REv. 87, 109 (1951).
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The draftsmen of the rule added the phrase "or denying" which was
not the situation to which Justice Hill had reference in the Coppo case.
Faced with a situation involving the denial part of the rule, the court
in the Dand's case and the instant case made the denial part of the
rule adversary in nature. That is in order to take advantage of Rule 16
when the court has denied a motion for a new trial, one must call the
trial court's attention to the rule. Such a rule making the denial part
of Rule 16 adversary in nature seems sound. There are two considera-
tions that support this conclusion. In the first place, the court said,
"This court does on occasion reverse judgments, set aside verdicts and
send cases back for new trials after trial judges have refused to grant
them; usually, however, because of the erroneous instructions, error
in admitting or refusing to admit evidence or other errors of law.", "
and secondly, Rule 16(8)"; which requires that such rulings be ex-
cepted to at the time. Thus, it would seem that if the "or denying"
phrase had been left out of Rule 16, an appeal from a motion denying
a new trial would in effect be an appeal from the judgment of the case
and as pointed out above, such an appeal would have to be predicated
on adequate foundation, that is, exceptions taken at the time. In other
words, an appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial would be
adversary in nature without Rule 16. The court, by adding this other
step and making Rule 16 adversary in so far as the "or denying" phrase
is concerned, has in effect reached the same result as if it had deleted
the "or denying" phrase from the rule.
It is submitted that the rule set out in: the instant case does not apply
to cases where the court grants a motion for a new trial. In such cases,
one should not have to call the court's attention to the rule in order to
take advantage of it on appeal. For as has been pointed out,2 6 the
Coppo case stressed that the rule should be for the benefit of the court
and if the court made the rule adversary in nature, it would deprive
itself of the very thing Justice Hill indicated the court desired in pro-
mulgating the rule."
Jury-Failure to Administer Oath Prior to Voir Dire. In State v.
Tharp, 2 no oath was administered to the prospective jurors prior to
the voir dire examination. The defendant discovered this in the early
24 Note 20 supra.
235 SpmaoR CouRT Rumz 16(8), 34A Wn2d 117.2 Note, 26 WASH. L Rxv. 87,109 (1951).
2
7Note 20 supra.
28 42 Wn.2d 494, 256 P2d 482 (1953).,
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stages of the trial but neither objected nor called the court's attention
to this omission until after the verdict when a motion for a new trial
was made and denied. The Supreme Court ruled that while the trial
court should administer an oath prior to the voir dire examination,
failure to do so was not reversible error when the defendant having
knowledge of this fact did not object until after the verdict. This rule
is in line with the authorities in other jurisdictions."
Washington has no statute requiring an oath before the voir dire
examination. It is, however, an element of the trial by common law."
The instant case implies that it is error not to administer the oath
prior to the voir dire examination. However, in order for the omission
of the oath to be reversible error, one must show either prejudice arising
from the omission or that he did not waive the right to object. The
defendant did not show either in the instant case.
The first basis the court used for holding the defendant did not come
within the rule was that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
omission of the oath. In order to show prejudice arising from the
omission of the oath, the court held the defendant must first show that
he exercised all his peremptory challenges and yet a disqualified person
was allowed to serve on the jury by reason of the omission. In the
alternative, he must show that he was in some other way prejudiced
by the omission.
The second basis the court used was that examination of the jurors
is procedural rather than jurisdictional. On this reasoning, omission
of the preliminary oath would be an error of the trial court to which an
exception would have to be taken at the time in order to assert the
error on appeal. By not excepting at the time, the defendant waived
his right to object later.
The two lines of reasoning used by the court leave these questions
unanswered: If the defendant does not take an exception, and, after he
exercises all his peremptory challenges, a disqualified person is allowed
to serve on the jury, is such reversible error? On the other hand, if the
29 50 C.J.S. 1057 (Juries, Sec. 276b) (1947). "As a general rule a preliminary oath
should be administered before questions of the voir dire examination are prepounded.
.. It has been held however that in the absence of a statute, it may not be improper
to conduct the examination without administration of the oath to the proposed juror,
especially where no request is made therefore, and, if it is inadvertently omitted, and
the attention of the court is not called thereto, it is too late after the verdict to make
the objection for the first time."
30 State v. Lloyd, 138 Wash. 8, 244 Pac. 130 (1926) ; State v. Harold, 68 Wash. 654,
123 Pac. 1076 (1912).
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party does not show prejudice but does object, does he now have error
to assert on appeal?
Trial without Jury-Incomplete Findings of Fact-Motion to
Vacate Judgment. In the case of Bowman v. Webster"' the question
before the supreme court was: where a trial court sits without a jury
must it make findings of fact as to the material issues involved? The
court answered the question in the affirmative and reversed and re-
manded the case with instructions to make and enter the necessary
findings of fact. The court held that where a trial court sits without a
jury, it must make the ultimate findings of fact as to the material issues
involved. This holding is based on Rule 17 of the Superior Court"
which restates a statutory provision which has stood since 1854.18
In the Bowman case, the court for the first time interprets Rule 15
of the Superior Court as amended March 27, 1952.1' The pertinent
portion thereof provides:
A judgment entered without findings of fact having been made is subject to
a motion to vacate, within the time for the taking of an appeal therefrom and
after vacation shall not be re-entered until rule 17 has been complied with.
The court stated that this rule only applies in cases where there is a
complete absence of findings of fact. The rule does not apply in cases
such as the principal case where there are findings of fact but none as
to the material issues involved.
Appealable Order-Suspended Sentence. Plea of Guilty as
Precluding Appeal. In the case of State v. Rose,"3 the defendant was
given probation and a suspended jail sentence which were revoked a
year and a half later and the defendant was sent to the penitentiary.
The first question raised is can a defendant under such circumstances
appeal. The defendant had been convicted a year and a half before
the appeal was taken and rule 46(1), Rules on Appeal," provides that
an appeal must be taken within 30 days after entry of judgment. The
court held that one can only appeal from a final judgment" and without
a sentence there is no.final judgment." The suspended jail term was
3142 Wn.2d 129, 253 P.2d 934 (1953).
3234A Wn2d 118.
8s RCW 4.44.050.
3, 34A Wn.2d (Pocket Part).3542 Wn.2d 509, 256 P2d. 493 (1953).86 34A Wn.2d 50.
3T State v. Farmer, 39 Wn2d 675, 237 Pac. 792 (1951).
as State v. King, 18 Wn2d 747, 140 P.2d 283 (1943) ; note 37 supra.
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not a sentence but merely a condition fixed by court relative to pro-
bation. Thus, in the principal case, there was no appealable order until
the defendant's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to the
penitentiary. The confusion on what is an appealable order and what
is not arises from two statutes, RCW 9.92.060 and RCW 9.95.200,210.
As the court said in State v. Farmer,"9 "There is a distinction under our
statutes between a suspension of sentence where it has been pronounced
but execution thereof suspended, [RCW 9.92.060] and a situation
where the pronouncement of a sentence is suspended or deferred."
RCW 9.95.200,210. In the former instance, the court has held that
such is a final order and an appeal from a suspended sentence may be
had." In the latter instance, which is the situation with which the court
is here faced, there is no final judgment and hence no appealable order.
In the second place, the state maintained that the defendant's plea
of guilty in Superior Court precluded an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court applied the rule that it had applied to appeals from justice
court to superior court:4 that is, a plea of guilty precludes an appeal
unless collateral issues are raised. This is the first time the court has
actually stated the above rule but such a rule has been implied before. 2
In the instant case, the court held that collateral issues were raised and
the appeal was allowed.
JoHN A. Gos.
Appellate Brief-Assignments of Error-Changes in the Rules.
Appeals continued to be dismissed in 1953 for failure to comply with
the requirements for setting out the assignments of error in the appel-
lant brief. Those cases coming up under the rules prior to the amend-
ments of January, 1953, 4' can be excused to some extent because of
the ambiguity of the old requirements. The appeals dismissed under
the amended rules,4 however, are inexcusable. Carelessness of counsel
39 Note 37 supra.
40 State v. Liliopoulos, 165 Wash. 197, 5 P.2d 319 (1931).
41 State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 Pac. 551 (1923) ; State v. Haddon, 179 Wash.
669, 38 P.2d 227 (1934).
42 State v. McDowall, 197 Wash. 323, 85 P.2d 660 (1938). Defendant pleaded guilty
but later sought to withdraw plea and plead not guilty. The motion was denied. De-
fendant was allowed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The bases of the
appeal were abuse of discretion by the tr ial court in denying defendant the right to
change his plea and denial of his constitutional rights in that he was not given a trial
by jury.
43 Cugini v. McPhail, 41 Wn.2d 804, 252 P.2d 290 (1953) ; Gilmartin v. Stevens, 143
Wash. Dec. 267, 261 P.2d 73 (1953).
44 Paulson v. Higgins, 143 Wash. Dec. 73, 260 P.2d 318 (1953) ; Kaiser Aluminum




rather than ambiguity in the new rules is the reason for the dismissal
of these appeals. Under the old rules, the only guides for the draftsman
were the general statement in Rule 42, "Each error relied on shall be
clearly pointed out and discussed under appropriately designated head-
ings,""5 and the more specific, but equivocal phrase in Rule 43, "... ap-
pellant must point out by number and description the finding of fact
upon which he predicates error. ... "I'
The objective of the appellate brief, like the objective of all techni-
cal writing, is the clear and accurate presentation of ideas. The plan
of organization is a formal one, designed to achieve a specific purpose
through logically organized and lucidly developed composition. The
purpose of the appellant's brief is to expedite apellate procedure by
assisting the court and the respondent in determining the exact grounds
upon which the appellant relies without recourse to the transcripts of
the trial court.," To realize this purpose the requirements for setting
out the grounds should be specific and unequivocal. Leaving the organi-
zational plan to the whim of the individual draftsman defeats the pri-
mary purpose of the brief. Thus briefs on appeal will be improved,
not by less stringent rules as a recent dissent suggests,4" but by (1) a
detailed and specific set of rules which admit of but one interpretation,
and (2) a demand for strict compliance with the rules.
The new rule requiring a verbatim transcript of the portion of the
finding or findings to which error is assigned is a step in this direction.
Now the draftsman must (1) refer to the finding of fact by number in
the "assignments of error" section of the brief; 9 (2) set out the portion
of the finding verbatim somewhere in the brief;"0 and, (3) discuss the
error relied on under appropriately designated headings in the brief."
The one point where more certainty could be achieved would be in
fixing a definite place for the verbatim transcript in the different
sections of the brief. Recently, the court suggested that the most logical
place for the findings to be described under the old rule was in the
"assignments of error" section. 2 To avoid confusion and create uni-
formity in the briefs, this suggestion might well hae been made part
45 RULE ON APPEAL 42, 34A Wn.2d 45.
46 RULE ON APPEAL 43, 34A Wn.2d 47.
47 Cugini v. McPhail, note 43 supra.
48 Paulson v. Higgins, note 44 supra. Held: Motion to file amended appellant's brief
must be made prior to filing of respondent's brief.
49 RULE ON APPEAL 42, 34A Wn. 2d (1953 Amend.).
50 RULES ON APPEA. 42 and 43, 34A Wn.2d (1953 Amend.).
51 RULE ON APPEAL, note 45 supra.
52 Cugini v. McPhail, note 43 supra.
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of the new rule. Then this section alone would immediately achieve
the objective desired by the court, that of informing the court and the
respondent of the exact grounds relied upon by the appellant.
Other Changes in Rules on Appeal. Rule 22. Bond for Costs.
Serving a copy of the appeal bond or written notice of a money deposit
in lieu thereof on the adverse party is a necessary procedural step for
perfecting an appeal under Rule 22. The old rule incidentally referred
to this requirement with the statement, ". . . an appeal bond to the
adverse party . . . be served and filed with the clerk of the superior
court. . . 2"1 The new rule drops "served" from this part of the rule,
but adds a statement spelling out the requirement. The addition reads,
"At the time the appeal bond is filed or deposit in lieu thereof is made,
a copy of the appeal bond or written notice of the deposit shall be
served on the adverse party."54
Rule 32. Jurisdictional Requirements in Civil Causes. Service of a
copy of the appeal bond or written notice of a money deposit is not
referred to under the 1953 amendment as a jurisdictional step in per-
fecting an appeal. The old rule in referring to the necessity for filing
an appeal bond required the appellant to ". . . give, serve, and file an
appeal bond. . . 2"' The amended rule omits the requirement of service
by dropping the word "serve" from this phrase. As amended, the rule
reads, "In order that the supreme court may secure jurisdiction of an
appeal in a civil cause, the appellant must-give notice of appeal:
give and file an appeal bond.... 2"1
Rule 33. Appeals and Cross-appeals in Civil Causes. Under the old
rule an appeal bond had to be filed in the office of the clerk of the
superior court within five days after the day of giving or filing of the
notice of appeal.5" A 1953 amendment to Rule 33 extends this period
for filing the appeal bond from five days to ten days.5"
Rule 46. Appeals in Criminal Cases. Subdivision (2) requiring the
clerk of the superior court to prepare and transmit to the clerk of the
Supreme Court copies of the judgment or order appealed from and a
copy of the journal entry showing the giving of oral notice of appeal
or a copy of the written notice of appeal has been changed in two ways.
53 RULE ON APPEAL 22, 34A Wn.2d 26.
54 RULE ON APPEAL 22, 34A Wn.2d Supp. 1 (1953 Amend.).
55 RULE ON APPEAL 32, 34A Wn.2d 32.
56 RULE ON APPEAL 32, 34A Wn2d Supp. 2 (1953 Amend.).
57 RULE ON APPEAL 33, 34A Wn.2d 35.
58 RULE ON APPEAL 33, 34A Wn.2d Supp. 2 (1953 Amend.).
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The rule as amended provides that the expense of preparing and trans-
mitting these copies shall be borne by the public prosecution," rather
than, as under the old rule, by the appellant.6 Further, each of these
copies must be certified under the new rule. Under the old rule there
was no express requirement of certification for the various copies sent
to the clerk of the Supreme Court.
Rule 50. Petitions for Rehearing. Formerly an attorney receiving a
petition for rehearing from the clerk of the court had to file an answer
within fifteen days."' The rule as amended requires the attorney to
serve a copy of the answer on opposing counsel in addition to filing it."2
A further new requirement calls for a filing of three copies each of the
petition for rehearing and of the answer with the clerk.
Rule 55. Costs on Appeals and Cost Bills. Under the old rule, if no
cost bill is served and filed, cost of the transcript was assessed at ten
cents per folio, and no provision was made for the clerk's discretion in
assessing any less where the actual cost was less.63 The amended rule
provides that an assessment be made at the statutory rate rather than
the flat ten cents a folio."' The statutory rate laid down by RCW
4.88.260 is "... . any sum actually paid or incurred by the prevailing
party as stenographer's fees, not exceeding ten cents a folio, for making
a transcript of the evidence or any part thereof included in the bill of
exceptions or statement of facts. .. ." The old rule laid down a single
rate of assessment; the amended rule now provides for a maximum
only and allows an assessment on the basis of the actual cost if under
ten cents a folio.
Rule 57. Other Original Writs. Certain governmental bodies did not
have to make a deposit of twenty-six dollars upon application for
original writs other than writs of habeas corpus under Rule 57. Those
excepted from making such a deposit included the Federal government
or any of its agencies, the state, any municipal corporation, or any
officer prosecuting on behalf of a municipal corporation. The rule as
amended drops the Federal government and its agencies from this list,
adds the county, and details the local governmental units favored by
the exception. The old rule read, "At the time of filing the application,
the petitioner shall deposit with the clerk, except when the petitioner
59RuLE ON APPEAL 46, 34A Wn.2d Supp. 4 (1953 Amend.).do RULE ON APPEAL 46, 34A Wn2d 50.6 RULE oN APPEAL 50, 34A Wn2d 55.
62 RULE ON APPEAL 50, 34A Wn2d Supp. 5 (1953 Amend.).
63RuLE or APPEAL 55, 34A Wn2d 60.
at RULE ON APPEAL 55, 34A Wn2d Supp. 5 (1953 Amend.).
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is the state or any municipal corporation, or any public officer prosecut-
ing on behalf of said municipal corporation, or the Federal government,
or any of its agencies, the sum of twenty-six dollars .. ."I The rule
as amended reads, ". . . except when the petitioner is the state, or
a county, city, town, or school district thereof, or any public officer
prosecuting on behalf of the state or one of such municipal cor-
porations. . .. ""
VINCENT L. GADBOW
Appellate Procedure-Appeal Bond--Cash Deposit in Lieu of. In Salter v. Heiser,
143 Wash. Dec. 182, 260 P.2d 882 (1953), a certificate was filed with the clerk stating
that cash had been deposited with the clerk of the superior court in lieu of a bond on
appeal. The cash referred to had been deposited on prior appeals, $1400 of which had
not been withdrawn. The court held that even though money was on deposit with the
clerk, the money had not been subjected to the conditions of an appeal bond in the
instant appeal and thus did not constitute a deposit in lieu of a bond in conformance with
Rule on Appeal 22, 34A Wn.2d (1951 amend.).
PROPERTY
Real Property-Mistake as to Boundary Line-Hostile Intent
Requirement in Adverse Possession. Brown v. Hubbard' was an
action to quiet title by adverse possession to a strip of land eight and
one-half feet wide lying between the property of the plaintiff and that
of the defendant, but wholly within the boundaries described by the
defendant's deed. The plaintiff's predecessor in interest testified that,
without the intention of taking any property belonging to another, she
marked off what she thought to be the true boundary by a hedge and
placed a rabbit pen and haphazardly piled rocks upon the land in dis-
pute in the belief that this was in fact her property. The plaintiff and
defendant testified that certain conversations with reference to the
boundary took place at least twelve years following the definition of
the boundary by the plaintiff's predecessor. In these conversations the
plaintiff pointed out the true boundary as recently indicated to him by
a third party and indicated that he would "have" to remove his hedge.
Subsequent to this conversation and upon an attempted interference
by the defendant this action was brought.
Upon appeal from a judgment for the defendant the court de-
clared that the plaintiff's possession must be actual and uninterrupted,
open and notorious, hostile and exclusive, and under a claim of right
05 RULE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn.2d 62.
61 RvLE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn.2d Supp. 6 (1953 Amend.).
142 Wn. 2d 867, 259 P.2d 391 (1953).
[MAY
